Book ´ Naming and Necessity Ç 172 pages Download ☆ Randarenewables

Reader Naming and Necessity

Book ´ Naming and Necessity Ç 172 pages Download ☆ Randarenewables ¼ If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language this is itEver since the publication of its original version Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence It redirecteHe startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths From these in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds further remarkable conseuences are drawn for the natures of things of people and of kinds; strong objections follow for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mindThis seminal work to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus is here published with a substantial new Preface by the autho For a revolutionary or landmark book it contains surprisingly nothing of substance I suppose it's interesting for people who already accept notions like necessity and the a priori and for those who think that the notion of meaning is clear enough to lean on for any substantive philosophical work But as far as I can tell philosophers who accept such notions don't do so on the basis of any argument for all their arguments depend on such notions So it's a good book for philosophers who like to let their assumptions do all the philosophical work for them For in it Kripke doesn't do much besides construct strawmen out of historical figures and then remark repeatedly about how it seems to him that these influential thinkers must all be so wrong that they appear downright stupid I think it's fair to say that if your view assumes that Russell and Frege were complete idiots who knew nothing about what they were doing then that's a serious problem with your view If I had known that all it took to be successful in philosophy was the hunch that the discipline's most influential figures are idiots then I would not have ever wasted my time pursuing it

Saul A. Kripke ↠ Naming and Necessity Kindle

To treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense surprisingly deep and widespread conseuences may be drawn The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties both of individual things including people and of kinds of things is revived So is a conseuent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by t It has to be said although it's too much said that Naming and Necessity revolutionized philosophy of language and is probably the most influential book in analytic philosophy in the past half century I've read Naming and Necessity four times now and am still surprised by it Kripke's style is particularly in relation to his peers strikingly clear In fact if I have one criticism to mention offhand it's that Kripke's style is too seductive Often he makes claims that sound eminently reasonable at first glance but become increasingly difficult to defend when probed I'm reminded in particular of Plato at his stylistically seductive moments That having been said Kripke's claims often seem to work out even under scrutiny At any rate I'd recommend to the reader delay being taken in as long as possible for maximum effect Naming and Necessity is sufficiently good that I'm sure I'll be rereading it sometime soon

Doc º Naming and Necessity ↠ Saul A. Kripke

Naming and NecessityIf there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language this is itEver since the publication of its original version Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence It redirected philosophical attention to neglected uestions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference in particular of naming and of identity From a critiue of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and generally To listen to this review as a podcast click below It really is a nice theory The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories It’s wrong You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not because I’m sure it’s wrong too if it is a theory Like many other works of philosophy and those of other subjects for that matter Naming and Necessity will likely be perplexing if you do not know what the author is arguing against At the time that Kripke gave these lectures the dominant theory in the philosophy of language was the Frege Russell theory of reference It is a rather elegant and simple theory and you can look up Russell’s famous paper “On Denoting” or uine’s “On What There Is” online if you would like to know about it But I will explain it briefly Essentially the idea is that names are shorthand descriptions Thus if you say “there’s a tiger over there” you’re really saying something like “there is an x over there such that x is feline yellow brown black striped uadrupedal solitary bigger than a human” and so on This way of analyzing names was I believe partly adopted because it carried no ontological commitment It avoids confusing situations like when you have to say “wizards don’t exist”—for how could you name the things wizards that do not exist? That is paradoxical On the Frege Russell view this awkwardness is avoided since when you assert that wizards do not exist you are really saying “there is no x such that x is humanoid magical bearded robed” and so on Thus by specifying the criteria lots of annoying existential uestions can be side stepped Nevertheless I think that most people when they first learn of this theory feel a bit uncomfortable with it The theory just is not intuitive I do not think that anything analogous to Russell’s analyses are going on in my head when I hear “there’s a tiger over there” In other words I do not think of tigers as bundles of ualities or clusters of descriptions but that the relationship of the name “tiger” to the living breathing animals is much straightforward Kripke is essentially arguing that our intuition is correct In fact it is Kripke’s express point to uphold our intuitions regarding names Of course some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything myself I really don’t know in a way what conclusive evidence one can have about anything ultimately speakingSeeing as Kripke is not fond of theories as the opening uote shows and is uite fond of intuition this puts him into a bit of a pickle for how is he supposed to argue against the theory? Thus most of Kripke’s arguments rely on bizarre counterfactuals which he expresses using the language of “possible worlds” I understood this as merely a way of speaking about hypothetical or counterfactual statements rather than any metaphysical doctrine about possibility and parallel worlds; and this way of speaking when understood as a figure of speech does convey the essential point rather well To explain Kripke’s argument let me come up with a bizarre counterfactual of my own Suppose that someone presumably with far too much time and money on their hands and with a uestionable sensitivity to animal rights decided to take some lions from Africa and introduce them into Asia Then suppose this person decided to shave the lions’ manes to paint them yellow brown and then to paint black stripes on them so as to look just like tigers Suppose he is even such a genius animal trainer that he trains these lions to behave indistinguishably from tigersNow we return to the above example If “there’s a tiger over there” really meant “there is an x over there such that x is feline yellow brown black striped uadrupedal solitary bigger than a human” then the statement would be perfectly true even if the person were pointing to the painted lions But it is not true Lions and tigers are what could be called ‘natural types’; and natural types are distinguished by some essential uality not by their total descriptions Kripke is really reviving the old notion of essentialism names pick out the object that possesses the essential property associated with that name In the case of lions and tigers I suppose the essential uality would be their genotypes Thus the essential property of a type of thing need not be the ualities by which we normally identify the thing We normally identify lions and tigers by the way they look and act but the above example shows that even those ualities are contingent; it is their respective essences their genotypes in this case which are the necessary ualities of tigers and lions This leads Kripke to disagree with another engrained philosophical idea the second N of the title that 'necessary' and ' a priori' are synonyms It was thought that only necessary truths could be known a priori and only a priori truths were necessary In other words you could only be certain about things you knew independently of experience Thus “all bachelors are unmarried” is in this view a necessary truth even if there are no bachelors at all simply because that is the definition of ‘bachelor’; it is an analytic statement true by definition a mere tautology and thus can be known a priori This restriction of necessary statements to trivial tautologies was I think a way of fighting against obscure metaphysical arguments such as the ontological argument for the existence of God Kripke as I said disagrees with this line of thinking For Kripke things can be known a priori that are not necessary and things can be necessary and learned empirically or a posteriori The case of the genotypes of lions and tigers is a case in point; it took a long time to discover DNA and to create the tools needed to investigate it in depth DNA was in other words obviously learned of empirically Nevertheless it is a necessary truth that lions have the lion essence genotype and tigers have the tiger essence genotype—because if they did not they would not be lions and tigers Necessary truths then need not be known a priori In other words you can be certain about some things you learn from experienceThe reverse distinction can also be made If I pick up a certain stick and say “I shall use this as the standard for my new measure the schmeter” I can know a priori that whatever length the stick is in say inches or meters it is exactly one schmeter However the exact length of a schmeter is contingent on the stick and we can imagine situations in which the stick was longer or shorter so the exact meaning of this a priori knowledge is contingent on some state of affairs To sum up Kripke’s distinction 'necessary' is a metaphysical term having to do with the essence of something while ' a priori' is an epistemological term having to do with how we come to know something As I hope you can see from my summary Kripke’s arguments are meant to be intuitive; he rejects certain philosophical ideas by just pointing to situations in which they fail to properly apply This I think is why Naming and Necessity is so well known one need not master some technical apparatus but merely think through the conseuences of some hypothetical scenarios Certainly this is not a perfect book Kripke is wordy and repetitive; this already short book could probably have been much shorter and crisper or could have at least covered territory Still Kripke was arguing against a whole paradigm; and paradigms do not go gentle into that good night When I finished this book I was fairly convinced; but as subseuent conversations Wastrel's comments most notably have shown me there are some awfully strong counter arguments And Kripke's stance of eschewing argument for intuition does not sit well with me Philosophical uestions are never so easily resolved In particular I am curious to see how Kripke proposes to deal with some of the situations which motivated the creation of the descriptive theory of names in the first place—for example statements like “wizards aren’t real” How can there be a causal connection with something that does not exist? And how can the name refer to a natural type of a fictitious object? After all facts are easy to talk about; fiction is another thing entirely